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Introduction
We study network formation. Our focus is on the role of sequential bargaining with group counterproposals in obtaining e¢ cient and stable outcomes.
As illustration only, say production of a good has as a side e¤ect, externalities, on agents (e.g. pollution). Anything has a "price". The producer is so good at networking and lobbying, with money transfers, that only she has connections with consumers, regulators, etc., and therefore options and all the bargaining power. Whatever she proposes is accepted, and she gets a monopolist payo¤ net of transfers within the status quo. Let other conditions be held constant. Years later, agents learn to network (e.g. using "Facebook"); so groups (environmental, etc.) , that create externalities by destroying goods, can form and so counterpropose. The old monopolist catches up and can do the same. We evaluate if the changes produce a new e¢ cient status quo, where net payo¤s and not the amount of goods, etc., are maximized. We use the idea in Nash (1950) [9] that if outside options (net payo¤ prospects in other groups) change, bargaining power is modi…ed and the e¤ects on stable payo¤s can be quanti…ed.
For this purpose, we construct two games with groups that di¤er in size where members are players that "propose" a permanent bilateral network link. Groups consist either of all n players or those in the new component (sets of links that connect a set of players directly or indirectly) that forms if the link forms. A link forms if and only if transfers match identically in a Nash demand 1 like game (Nash (1950) [10] ) in each period where players in a group choose transfers simultaneously. Some transfers are interpreted as unilateral rejections. These can ‡ow across components only in the n-group game. Links are proposed in an order similar to a game of bridge as in Aumann and Myerson (1988) [2] ; however, our groups are not bilateral. Such order allows players to counterpropose in groups. Payo¤s are obtained if the game ends. Instead, these are given by any payo¤ allocation rule and net of transfers (payo¤s are therefore endogenous). Such rules are derived from any partition or value function (of the network structure) of a network game with and without links of communication respectively; so externalities among players in distinct components are possible.
We rule out subgameperfect equilibria (SPE) with histories where, say, every player in a group expects the other members to choose a unilateral rejection even if they can do better by coordinating and matching transfers. Second, we rule out SPE outcomes that even though better are not "rational" for the group. For the …rst type of coordination failure, we use group SPE, (GSPE). This re…nement selects group e¢ cient SPE transfer pro…le's continuation values assuming future players do the same. For the second type, we use Nash GSPE, a GSPE where continuation values are the Nash Bargaining Solution which involves not just e¢ cient but rational group coordination (See Nieva (2008b) [12] for implementation, etc).
E¢ ciency is characterized in terms of cyclical monotonicity of payo¤ allocation rules in the component-group game. Under this condition, the total payo¤ of the new component that results if a given link forms can be lower than the sum of the total payo¤s of the merged components (which result if the given link is severed), provided the new component is not in the e¢ cient network. The n-group game yields always e¢ ciency (in networks without communication). Coexistence of e¢ ciency and ine¢ ciency can occur only under GSPE.
E¢ ciency results, as for transfers, link formation depends on the total continuation value of the new group in a new component relative to the sum of all members' outside options. The former is the total net payo¤ in the expected e¢ cient network for the new group. The latter is the sum of total net payo¤s of the groups in the merged components as no more links are expected to form.
Coexistence is eliminated as the Nash Bargaining Solution for a player is a monotonic function of her relative outside option. Total outside options of all players in a new component (if another link is proposed) may decrease relative to the sum of their outside options in the merged components. So the e¢ cient network can fail to form. Say, if its net payo¤s in a GSPE are better than outside options of all players in the new component but worse than outside options for some of these players in the merged components (See example).
Our paper belongs to the literature that studies the role of simultaneous payo¤ determination and link formation (bargaining) in non cooperative network formation games in solving the tension between stability and e¢ ciency.
game. Rich transfers account for externalities in general; however, e¢ cient and ine¢ cient equilibria coexist.
Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7] raise the importance of sequentiality and non group bargaining as all their SPE are e¢ cient for a large class of value functions. The result is obtained as the e¢ cient network is not "blocked" and so can block ine¢ cient ones. In Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] , in principle, given that a previous proposer can ask all of the rest of the payo¤ of the e¢ cient network, his demand is only constrained by the next proposer not reciprocating links of the connected e¢ cient network. As the latter, in turn, can ask for all the remainder in the best resulting ine¢ cient network, the earlier proposer's demand is constrained by the di¤erence. These constrained demands (in the e¢ cient network) can always block n decreasing outside options (as for total payo¤ monotonicity in players'size of components) as these can o¤er better prospects even though these are decreasing too. As outside options di¤er in Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7] , payo¤ predictions di¤er. In the latter case, results also hold if there are externalities and even without monotonicity as sorts of "transfers" with contingent cost contributions across components are possible (so as in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4] , the same results but in a sequential game) in variations of their game.
Instead, our players in groups counterpropose. As net payo¤s in the e¢ cient network may not satisfy more than n outside options unless we have n player groups, results follow. Nieva (2008a) [11] uses bilateral groups to answer open questions (e.g. conditions for coexistence) in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4] if counterproposals are possible.
Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) [13] …nd that cooperative re…nements like Strong and Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium (that involve counterproposals in a sense) in an n and 3-player simultaneous game respectively can yield ine¢ ciency. As for the next idea and for the di¤erence in notions of stability, our results are complementary and general as they focus in communication networks without externalities. Note that sequentiality is not an issue.
The criticism that results are sensitive to irrelevant details of the sequential bargaining protocol does not apply. A necessary condition for a GSPE and su¢ -cient for a SPE is that net payo¤s in the …nal network cannot be blocked. So our approach is both cooperative and noncooperative; nothing is irrelevant. Equilibrium transfers and net payo¤s have to satisfy sets of inequalities associated to some cooperative solution (explicit in our bargaining protocols) de…ned by "the possibilities for coalition (groups) forming, promising, and threatening...., rather than whose turn it is to speak" (Aumann (1988) [1] ).
The criticism applies neither to Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] nor to Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7] as their games resemble bargaining without groups and counterproposals, a degenerate case in our "family" of games. It applies "whenever players rather than coalitions propose coalitions".
In section 2, we give notation for networks, link payo¤ allocation rules to value or partition functions, transform the Aumann and Myerson (1988) [2] game into our general game, and de…ne stability, groups and transfers'speci…cs. In section 3, we study e¢ ciency (proofs are in Appendix). We conclude. The set of players in a network relationship is N = f1; :::; ng. A network g is a set of unordered pairs of distinct players belonging to N: Each pair is represented by a link between the two players. So g is also the set of links of g: The number of links in g is jgj : The set of players with at least one link in network g is N (g) :
The link that joins players i and j is ij. The network with the maximum number of links is the complete network g N . In the empty network g ; , there are no links, players are isolated : The set G of all possible networks on N is fg : g g N g: The network that results by adding link ij to network g is g + ij: An ordered network or (vector) ! g is a list of the jgj links in g such that its e th entry is the e th link that has formed. The subvector that contains the …rst k links that have formed is ! g K ; where K = f1; :::kg. It is a subvector of the partitioned vector
A path in a network g 2 G between players i and j is a sequence of players i 1 ; :::; i K with i k i k+1 2 g for all k 2 f1; :::; K 1g ; where i 1 = i and i K = j 2 g. A component of a network g is is a non empty subset of the network g 0 g such that for all i; j 2 N (g 0 ); there exists a path between players i and j in g 0 ; and if i 2 N (g 0 ) and ij 2 g, then ij 2 g 0 : The set of components of g is C (g) :
Payo¤ Allocation Rules in Networks
We study communication network and network games. In the …rst case (skip wlg.), links are of communication and the primitive is a cooperative game in partition function form w with N as the player set de…ned as follows:
The set of all coalitions is CL = fSjS N; S 6 = ?g: The set of partitions of N is P T: The set fS 1 ; :::; S l g 2 P T if and only if S l k=1 S k = N; 8k 2 f1; ::; lg ; S k 6 = ? and S k \ S j = ; if k 6 = j and j 2 f1; ::; lg : Let ECL be the set of embedded coalitions, the set of coalitions with speci…cations as to how the other players are aligned. Formally: ECL = f(S; Q)jS 2 Q 2 P T g: For any …nite set L, let R L denote the set of real vectors indexed on the members of L. A game in partition function form is a vector w 2 R ECL . For any such w 2 R ECL and any embedded coalition (S; Q) 2 ECL; w N S;Q ; the (S; Q) component of w N ; is interpreted as the payo¤ (transferable utility) which the coalition S would have to divide if they coordinate e¤ectively among its members if all the players were aligned into the coalitions of partition Q.
A communication network game v assumes that e¤ective coordination can occur if all players in a coalition can communicate directly or indirectly with all the other members, if N (g) = N g N : So a coalition's value depends not only on the partition but on the network structure. We represent this latter dependence by v g 2 R ECL for all g 2 G: A network game with communication is denoted by a list v where each entry corresponds to a unique g 2 G:
In network games, there is a value function v de…ned on the set of networks. 
A network g is constrained e¢ cient relative to v and if there does not exist any • g 2 G and a payo¤ allocation rule~ such that:
i for all i with strict inequality for some i and (b) for all g 2 G and for all components g
The last notion is adequate if transfers ‡ow only within components.
The Aumann-Myerson Game
In Aumann-Myerson (1988) Ordered network ! g is terminal and so is its last link ij jgj if these are the last to form at the end of the game. Then, each player receives its payo¤ according to the Myerson values (Myerson (1977) [8] ), a payo¤ allocation rule, in network g: As there is perfect information, this game has subgameperfect equilibria (SPE) each associated to a unique …nal network.
The General Transfer Game
The only di¤erence between our games and that in A-M is that the formation of a link depends on a group of players, that includes the two players that have such link, choosing transfers out of their payo¤s in terminal networks.
Players'Actions, Histories and Networks
The initial history in the game T r is h 0 = ;. Let` h 0 be a set of links that includes the link to be proposed at h 0 , ij h 0 ; where ij h 0 = o ; r h 0 ; and r h 0 = 1; so ij h 0 is the …rst link in the A-M exogenous order o ; : In period 5 0; there are no links and so g h 0 = g ; . Only if a player belongs to the group of proposers, her action set is non trivial; that is, only if q 2 P h 0 = N ` h 0 ; then she chooses t q 2 T q h 0 = L h 0 , a vector of transfers: We de…ne iteratively history h k+1 ; a sequence of transfers chosen: For k = 0; ::; k, where k is the maximum number of periods the game can have, we take as given: history h k = t 1 ; t 0 ; ::; t (k 1) ; where t 1 = h 0 ; the ordered network that has formed ! g h k ; the action set for player q, If transfers match, the next history and ordered network are respectively
terminal history is reached. Otherwise, the action set
where
Suppose h is a terminal history with terminal network ! g (h). So h 1 is the history in period jh 1 j such that jh 1 j + 1 is the total number of periods in the game if the game ends with ! g (h) after some action was played in h 1 . By de…nition h describes an entire sequence of actions from the start of the game on. We denote by H k as the set of all such terminal histories that can be identi…ed with the set of possible outcomes when the game is played.
Pure Strategies and Payo¤s
A pure strategy for player i is a contingent plan on how to play at period k of the game for possible histories h k . Let H k denote the set of all period k-histories, and
A pure strategy for player i is a sequence of maps fs
The set of pure strategies for player i in the game is denoted by S i : A sequence of actions for a pro…le for such strategies s 2 S is called the path of the strategy pro…le, where S is the set of all strategy pro…les: In period zero, actions are t 0 = s 0 h 0 : The actions in period 1 are t 2 = s 2 t 1 and so on. Since the terminal histories represent an entire sequence of play or path associated with a given strategy, one can represent each players'corresponding overall's payo¤ as a function u i : H k ! R. Abusing notation, we denote the payo¤ vector to pro…le s 2 S as u(s) = u (h), where h is the path of s, as one can assign an outcome in H k to each strategy s 2 S: In all our games, payo¤s outcomes are realized only at the end of period jh 1 j for all terminal histories h; these are denoted by (h 1 ; t) where (h 1 ; t) = h. Hence, payo¤s associated to h equal the period payo¤s in h 1 ; that is, u (h) = (h 1 ; t). In that case, players receive their payo¤ according to the payo¤ allocation rule net of transfers.
Stability Concepts
Nash Equilibrium A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a strategy pro…le s such that no player i can do better with a di¤erent strategy, u i (s i ; s I ) u i (s Let terminal histories h 0 be such that h 0 = (h k ; t k ; ::; t jh 0 1 j ) and the associated subset of H k be denoted by H k (h k ): As one can assign an outcome in H k (h k ) to each restriction pro…le sjh k where s 2 S, the overall payo¤ vector to the restriction sjh k , will be denoted abusing notation by u(sjh k ): Thus, one can speak of Nash equilibria of T r h k . A strategy pro…le s in T r is a SPE if, for every h k , the restriction sjh k to T r h k is a Nash equilibrium of T r h k :
Re…nements Say, we have our game T r with two players and only one period. The Nash equilibria are identical as those in the Nash Demand game (Nash (1950) [10] ) or that in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4] ; coordination failures are possible. In general, if there are at least two individual transfers that di¤er (maybe one or two of them are unilateral rejections) from the other ones at any history in our game, such transfer pro…le can be supported as a SPE even though the group that proposes can do better if it coordinates on a transfer match (if continuation values are better for all). Based on Bernheim and Ray (1989) [3], we assume e¢ cient cooperative bargaining in order to eliminate such equilibria in a "similar" way pairwise Nash equilibria does in the simultaneous games in Bloch and Jackson (2007) [4] : A group SPE (GSPE) is a SPE strategy pro…le s such that at every history h k there does not exist a transfer match t 0k such that for all i 2 P h k ; the individual GSPE continuation value u i (sj h k ; t 0k ) > u i (sjh k ): If the latter inequality is weak, then we have a strong GSPE . If in addition pairs, coordinate on the continuation value consistent with the Nash bargaining solution, then we have a Nash GSPE (in any solution, future pairs do the same). Existence, uniqueness, and implementation of Nash GSPE are studied in a companion paper Nieva (2008b) [12] . Note that all these re…nements of SPE are consistent. This means that these are used in any future history, or, intuitively, credible.
Group and Transfer Speci…cs
Component-group Game: Let ij be the link proposed at history h. Given h, the group of proposers P (h) coincides with the players in the new component
Each proposer q 2 P (h) at h chooses simultaneously an in…nite dimensional vector of transfers t q (h). An entry in this vector is denoted by t
where history h + = h or follows h after link ij forms; i.e., its subvector h + jhj+1 = (h; t) ; where t is a transfer match; so ! g (h
For all k 2 1; ::; n 2 and for all q 2 P (h) ; the k th entry in t q (h; h + ) is t q zz 0 (k) (:), a transfer from z (k) 2 P (h) to z 0 (k) 2 N that player q proposes if network ! g (h + ) is terminal; so, for simplicity, there are no transfers contingent on transfers; hence, t q (h;
lp (h; h) = 0; and not de…ned in histories after link ij is rejected: Self transfers are zero; t q lp (:
transfers are only among members in P (h) if link ij is terminal. There are no transfer across components g 0 (h + ) 2 C (g (h + )) and isolated players. Abusing notation, denote isolated players as a component
Consider terminal history h 2 H k with terminal network ! g : The subvector h K e , e jgj ; is the history in period k e where the e th link of ! g forms; h is then consistent with h K e : Let t (h K e ) be the transfer match at h K e : Period payo¤s are not discounted and these are zero unless g = g N and t (h 1 ) is a transfer match, or g 6 = g N and t (h 1 ) is not a transfer match. In any case, q 2 N gets her payo¤ given by the allocation rule g q in terminal network g plus transfers to her from proposers m 2 P (h K e ) ; e jgj ; minus her transfers to other players p 2 N agreed upon when she proposes. Let = fejq 2 P (h K e )g ; fh K e g e2 is the set of all histories where q proposes. The net payo¤ for q is
The n-group Game: Abusing notation, it is the component game where for all h, the n players are in the "new component" if ij (h) forms.
E¢ ciency Analysis
First, we illustrate why a necessary condition for a GSPE and su¢ cient for a SPE is that a transfer match and net payo¤ s in the …nal network have to satisfy sets of inequalities, or, equivalently, net payo¤ s cannot be blocked by a group in another network.
Example: A three player network game where the order is 12; 23; 13 1----------2 3 Suppose GSPE (or strong GSPE) is used. If network 213 forms with any given transfer match, the complete network forms in any GSPE of the subgame at next period 3 as link 23 is accepted. If a player unilaterally rejects 23, players obtain any given associated triplet of net payo¤s in terminal network 213; these outside options sum up to zero. As the complete network's total payo¤ is 1:2; the same group in the complete network can block outside options with better net payo¤s (cooperative notions using inequality conditions); as then, there is no individual pro…table deviation, there is always a Nash equilibrium and so a SPE in period 3 that gives any player at least the continuation value of her unilaterally rejecting (non cooperative notions). Note that total continuation values of any such given transfer match sum up to 1:2 in previous period 2.
If any network is blocked by the complete (ordered) network (in the sense above), terminal on the path of some strategy pro…le, that is, if all required inequalities 2 are satis…ed, then the complete network is a SPE outcome as then, it is not blocked. In general, there can be e¢ cient and ine¢ cient SPE …nal networks with net payo¤s that don't require satisfying such inequalities. More networks can be …nal if players in groups fail to coordinate by choosing unilateral rejections. Note that, such failure is not allowed in any cooperative solution 3 . Hence, once we require GSPE, not being blocked becomes a necessary condition for a network to be …nal. Now, even if all the required inequalities are satis…ed for a given network to be …nal (say, in a di¤erent scenario, network 213 o¤ering net payo¤s that are better than (:5; :5:0) and net payo¤s in the complete network, etc.), in general, transfer matches may coexist that don't satisfy the inequalities 4 and can not be eliminated in a GSPE; its continuation payo¤s may be better for one member and worse for the other one relative to the ones of matches that do satisfy the inequalities (See Nieva (2008a) [11] for examples).
Next, with the same example, we illustrate the idea that for all equilibria to be e¢ cient a necessary condition is that a Nash GSPE like solution is used ; moreover, such a solution is consistent with Aumann's quote in the introduction.
Even if total continuation values in period 2 are better than total outside options, 1:2 > :5+:5+0; link 13 may not form. Given any transfer match, there is a GSPE in next period 3 in which at least one of the three players looses relative to (:5; :5; 0). Then, accepting link 13 is not even a SPE outcome in the subgame at period 2. For any loser, it is optimal to unilaterally reject. The only way to ensure that the three players get at least their outside options in period 2 is for the transfer match not to change them in next period 3. But its sum has to be equal to zero: So, in general, e¢ ciency is not an equilibrium. However, under Nash GSPE, e¢ ciency is restored as any division of 1:2 among the three players is a continuation value for an appropriate transfer match in period 2. Say, if transfer match implies the triplet (:15; :15; :3); the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) adds We think that GSPE is not reasonable in this set up as it does not respond by increasing the continuation value of a player with a higher outside option. Groups fail to coordinate in subtle threats. Note that implicit in Aumann's quote is the assumption that threats have to be the outcome of cooperation, rational, and not just e¢ cient coordination of actions.
The illustration for the role of cyclical monotonicity (c.m) and the irrelevance of contingent transfers in obtaining e¢ ciency follows. Loosely, if c.m. holds all players in a group on a path to an e¢ cient ordered network gain by matching transfers. As a consequence, they merge components they belong to to begin with. So what matters for link formation are total continuation payo¤s of groups or, equivalently, components, as contingent transfers are "renegotiated" (See, in contrast, the bilateral-group game in Nieva (2008a) [11] ).
Let d and a be the total payo¤ for the complete network and the two link network respectively in the same example. Denote by c and b c the total payo¤ for the linked players in a one link network and that of the isolated player respectively. Let b i , b j and b l be the payo¤ for the individual players in the empty network. The order is ij, jl; il.
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for e¢ cient Nash GSPE are: Note that the …rst term in brackets in each inequality is the Nash Surplus, the amount beyond the total outside options that all proposers receive if a link forms. Also, in III, group fi; jg receives In general, strong c.m. is su¢ cient but not necessary. Consider a non symmetric payo¤ allocation rule. Even if the e¢ cient network can still be reached after a deviation, the resulting ine¢ cient …nal network may not block continuation values of not deviating.
The term cyclical is used as a new component that results by merging, say, two, may have a total payo¤ lower than the sum of payo¤s in these two even if the former has more members. That is not true with size monotonicity in Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] . Note that example exhibits size monotonicity.
The condition has more inequalities as the total payo¤ of a given component (and so outside options) may be in ‡uenced by externalities depending on the order and number of merged components by the time the players in the given component group propose again. Before formalizing, we de…ne concepts.
Given network g, the component value function is v 0g : C (g) ! R. The total payo¤ of a component is v 0 (g 0 ) ; g 0 2 C (g) ; and it is equal to the sum of its members' payo¤ allocations,
merge. Abusing notation, denote a player i without links as a component ! g 0; of ! g . Set N ! g 0; = i: The total continuation value for players
. Condition: Given order o, and payo¤ allocation rule ; the set of component value functions v 0g , g 2 G; is strong (weak) cyclical monotonic if for each (at least one) e¢ cient ordered network
Iteratively for x = 1; :::; jgj 1: For t = 1; :; p ( ! g X ), the Nash surplus for players in merged component ! g
, it is never a Nash GSPE to form a link ij = 2 g. N 2 [ N 3 ) be the value of the coalition of n players. Let the three sets be disjoint and so a partition of N , jN j = jN 1 j + jN 2 j + jN 3 j : Let N 1 and N 2 merge …rst on a path to ! g . Two conditions for this (incomplete) "order of …ner partitions" are
These conditions may seem complex and most importantly not practical. But note that superadditivity in links, superadditivity of cooperative games and "monotonicity" as in Currarini and Morelli (2000) [5] and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) [7] imply our condition but not viceversa. So, this complexity seems to be the cost of generality.
Theorem 1: Under strong c.m, all Nash GSPE are e¢ cient and constrained e¢ cient.
Corollary 1: If all Nash GSPE are e¢ cient then weak c.m. holds. In the n-group game the analysis is very similar. Theorem 2: All Nash GSPE outcomes are e¢ cient for all network games.
Conclusion
We study two "cooperative and noncooperative" sequential network formation games with counterproposals of transfers tied to link formation. It seems to be that a necessary condition for solving the tension between stability and e¢ ciency is that the e¢ cient network can block. With counterproposals, the all player group is su¢ cient. The role of groups of heterogenous sizes with other factors, maybe overlooked, are important issues. Bilateral groups are studied in Nieva (2008a) [11] . Anyway, a Nash GSPE like solution concept is needed in general. Its appeal is being consistent with rational threat behavior of blocking coalitions (for its implementation, see Nieva (2008b) [12] ).
Appendix
Proof Th. 1: Let g be e¢ cient. Suppose for now that g is …nal if it forms. By contradiction, let some ordered network ! g 1 be …nal. As for strong c.m., ! g forms. The total continuation value for proposers at history h K j gj 1 ; where the (j gj 1) th link of ! g , o ! g 2 ( r) ; forms, is P i2P ( h K j gj 1 ) u i s j h K j gj 1 ; t = F ! g 0 1 ; t is a transfer match, and s j h K j gj 1 ; t is a Nash GSPE in subgame T r h K j gj 1 ; t .
By induction for x = 2; :::; j gj 1, suppose that if ! g (X 1) forms, ! g does too. Let some ! g X be …nal. By strong c.m. (a+b), if link o ! g X ( r) 2 ! g is the last e¢ cient link in the current order to be proposed (at h K j gj (x 1) ), without loss of generality, it is accepted as outside options can be improved upon,
where s j h K j gj (x 1) ; t d is a Nash GSPE and t d contains unilateral rejections. Then at least this e¢ cient link forms in the current order o ! g X : In a possible scenario, using (a+b), an e¢ cient r th < r preceding link forms if ! g is instead the …nal ordered network, where g = g. Without loss of generality, P i2P ( h K j gj x ) u i s j h K j gj x ; t = F ! g 0 X , 5 if ! g is the …nal ordered network: Hence if ! g X forms ! g forms. After using (c) with a "reverse" argument, if ! g forms, it is …nal Proof Th. 2: Consider any g as a component with n players. Then, (a+c) in c.m. hold. We show (b). Suppose that no e¢ cient link is left to be proposed in the current order: if a …rst ine¢ cient one forms, its Nash GSPE continuation net payo¤s have to improve on (1) given net payo¤s obtained if all remaining links are rejected; second, the same is true if another ine¢ cient link forms with respect to (2) continuation net payo¤s if an ine¢ cient link is expected to form in a Nash GSPE. As (a) holds, from Th. 1, there is a transfer match such that Nash GSPE continuation net payo¤s are better than (2) or (1) if the last e¢ cient link is rejected. Any ine¢ cient link proposed earlier on is rejected as at least one player gains expecting the e¢ cient network to form (regardless of the e¢ cient link in the order that forms later on) as there is still an e¢ cient link to be proposed. As this holds for any given payo¤s, if an e¢ cient link forms, another e¢ cient one forms next 5 These are total net payo¤s for the group P h K j gj x in the e¢ cient network if players in components to be merged agree at h K j gj x on a transfer match.
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